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Alternative naming: children familiar with both names of an object (e.g., rabbit
and bunny, rabbit and animal) have to say which one of the two names a
puppet has not used (e.g. ‘What is it?’ – puppet: ‘Animal’, child: ‘Rabbit’).
Young children tend to repeat what the puppet says.
Ambiguous figures test: children are shown how the same ambiguous drawing
(duck/rabbit) joined to the body of a rabbit and of a duck can be a rabbit’s as well
as a duck’s head. Children are then shown the head without body and asked what
it is and are probed for whether they can acknowledge both kinds.
Appearance reality distinction: ability to distinguish appearance (looks like a
rock) from reality (is a sponge).
Experiential record: children keep track of which events an agent experienced
(e.g., was present or looked at) and which the agent did not. The representation
of the events the agent experienced is activated whenever attention shifts to
the agent.
Explicit knowledge: a regularity (if x then y) is explicitly (declaratively) known if
the inference from x to y is informed by a representation of the conditional that
licenses it (in contrast to implicit knowledge).
False sign task: a direction sign points in the wrong direction and children,
knowing where the indicated place really is, are asked where the sign shows
that it is.
Identity statements task: children are told about two seemingly different
people (e.g., the teacher and Susi’s mum). They know where the teacher is, but
not where Susi’s mum is. Then they are told that Susi’s mum is the teacher.
Can they infer where Susi’s mum is?
Implicit knowledge: a regularity (if x then y) can be implicitly (procedurally)
known by inferring y whenever x is known without representing the
conditional that licenses this inference.
Level 1 perspective taking: refers to the ability to distinguish what another
person can see from what that person cannot see.
Level 2 perspective taking: requires understanding that two people may see or
interpret something, which both can see, differently depending on their
vantage point (e.g., a drawing of a turtle on a table showing the turtle on its feet
or lying on its back).
Objective reasons for action: facts that count in favour of acting in a certain
way (e.g., there is an objective reason for Max to go to the green cupboard).
Online tasks: false belief tasks in which the observed events generate online
ideas about what will happen next or what an agent is doing without requiring a
judgment about what will happen next or about justifying reasons for the action.
Simulation theory: a family of views affirming that our conception of others’
mental states and processes essentially involves the ability mentally to
simulate them.
Standard (classical) false belief test: story character Mistaken Max fails to
witness how his chocolate is unexpectedly transferred, therefore believing that
it is still in its original location. Children have to predict where he will look for it:
in its original or in its new location.
Subjective reasons for action: propositional attitudes that make it rational to act
in a certain way (e.g., Max has a subjective reason to go to the blue cupboard).
Theory of mind: a cover term for the ability to attribute mental states to other
people and to oneself.Evidence is accumulating that infants are sensitive to
people’s false beliefs, whereas children pass the stan-
dard false belief test at around 4 years of age. Debate
currently centres on the nature of early and late under-
standing. We defend the view that early sensitivity to
false beliefs shown in ‘online tasks’ (where engagement
with ongoing events reflects an expectation of what will
happen without a judgement that it will happen) reflects
implicit/unconscious social knowledge of lawful regu-
larities. The traditional false belief task requires explicit
consideration of the agent’s subjective perspective on
his reasons for action. This requires an intentional
switch of perspectives not possible before 4 years of
age as evidenced by correlations between the false belief
task and many different perspective-taking tasks.
A puzzle about belief
Young children’s understanding of the role of belief in
intentional action has been investigated intensely over
the past few decades. This research has uncovered dissoci-
ation between different measures of understanding. In the
classical false belief tasks, children are asked to predict
where the protagonist, Mistaken Max, will look for an
object. Max puts his chocolate in the blue cupboard. In
his absence it is transferred to the green cupboard. When
Max returns, children are asked where he will look for his
chocolate [1]. Most 2- and 3-year-olds reliably and reso-
lutely claim that Max will look in the green cupboard, yet
young children do show sensitivity to false beliefs in a
range of what might be called ‘online tasks’ (Box 1). For
example, in the Anticipatory Looking task children observe
the agent watching an object being moved from one cover to
another and have learned that the agent’s hand will appear
through whichever window is located behind the object’s
actual location. In the false belief condition, the agent is
distracted by a phone call and fails to see how it is removed
from that second cover, believing it is still in there. The
windows start blinking to indicate that the agent is about
to search for the object. The child’s eye gaze to the left or
right window is recorded as indicator of where the child
expects the agent’s hand to appear [2].
One possible explanation for the dissociation holds that
the standard test masks existing knowledge at the earlier
age due to performance limitations (competence masking)
[3]. An alternative view posits that success in the two typesCorresponding author: Perner, J. (josef.perner@sbg.ac.at)
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acterised as implicit and explicit [4–6]. We begin by review-
ing the general case for an implicit–explicit distinction and
then present an explanation of why the implicit knowledge
base is insufficient for success on ‘direct’ tasks. We go on
to compare this account with the competence maskingTheory theory: a family of views on which our conception of others’ mental
states and processes is in salient respects comparable with a scientific theory.
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Box 1. Tasks showing infants’ sensitivity to belief
Anticipatory looking [2]
The set-up for this task was later used by Low and Watts [18] and is
shown in Figure 1. Children learn first that, when a target object is put
under one of two covers, the agent will always reach through the
window behind that cover. Children’s anticipatory looking to this
window is triggered by both windows starting to blink. In Southgate
et al.’s version [2], children observe the agent watching the object
being moved from one cover to the other. The agent is then distracted
by a phone call and fails to see how the object is removed from under
the second cover. The windows start blinking to indicate that the
agent is about to search for the object. The child’s eye gaze to the left
or right window is recorded as an indicator of where the child expects
the agent’s hand to appear.
Violation of expectation [5]
Infants are shown either the objectively expected (when the agent
goes to or reaches to the believed location) or the unexpected action
(when the agent goes to the object’s actual location). Looking for
longer at the unexpected than at the expected action is interpreted as
infants sharing these objective expectations.
Helping [37]
In the helping task of Buttelmann et al. [37], an experimenter showed
18- month-olds how to lock and unlock two boxes. With the boxes left
unlocked, a male agent entered the room, hid a toy in one of them,
and left again. In the agent’s absence, the experimenter transferred
the toy to the other box and locked both boxes. On his return, the
agent tried to open the box where he had hidden the toy, without
success. When prompted to help the agent, most infants approached
the other box (i.e., the one the agent had not tried to open),
suggesting that they had realized that the agent falsely believed the
toy was still in its original location and wanted to retrieve it.
Referential communication [38–40]
In the referential communication task of Southgate et al. [40], 17-
month-olds watched an agent hide two different toys in two boxes with
lids. After the agent’s departure, the experimenter switched the toys.
On her return, the agent pointed to one of the boxes and announced
that the toy inside it was a ‘sefo’. When asked to hand her the sefo, most
infants gave her the object from the other box, evidently realizing that
the agent falsely meant to refer to the toy in the other box, because she
erroneously believed it to be in the pointed-at box.
Review Trends in Cognitive Sciences October 2012, Vol. 16, No. 10account. In brief, we argue that online tasks reflect an
implicit theory of behaviour, whereas direct tests require
children to offer reason-giving explanations of intentional
actions.
Implicit versus explicit knowledge
Early sensitivity to belief responds to task manipulations
in much the same way that implicit knowledge does in
near-threshold perception and in blind-sight patients [7]
(Box 2). This fact speaks in favour of implicit knowledge as
the underlying basis on which performance in online tasks
rests. An important question here is why blind-seers are
unable to exploit implicit visual information in making
(unprompted) judgements about the stimulus. The natural
answer is that, because they lack any conscious visual
experience of the object, they do not consider themselves
to be in a position to tell what the object is like. (They know
that there is an object there only because the examiner told
them.) Judgements normally aim to express knowledgeBox 2. The case for implicitness of early competence
There are three points of analogy between early sensitivity to belief
and implicit knowledge in blind-sight and near-threshold percep-
tion.
 Early sensitivity is observed in indirect (anticipatory looking) but
not in direct tests (question about future action), an important
indicator of implicit knowledge [41]. Clements and Perner
[4,22,42,43] had Mistaken Max reappear from different exits
depending on where he is looking for his object. At 3 years of
age, most children looked to the exit where Max thought the
object was, at the same time claiming in their explicit answers that
he will come out of the other exit, where the object actually was.
 Early sensitivity is observed in spontaneous responses without
delay more often than when children hesitate [42]. This corre-
sponds to two characteristics of implicit knowledge: it is available
for only a few seconds after stimulus presentation [44] and is
better available if the response does not require a commitment
(i.e., the person is asked to guess and not asked to judge) [45].
 Implicit knowledge is observed in the absence of any measurable
signs of uncertainty [46]. In fact, children disallow even the
possibility that the agent might appear where he thinks the object
is, despite their look expecting him there [22].
520and blind-seers do not think that they have any knowledge
of the object’s features. The corresponding developmental
question is: why is young children’s implicit knowledge not
sufficient to enable them to pass direct tests? Our answer
to this question has three elements. (1) Direct tests induce
one to think of the to-be-predicted behaviour as an inten-
tional action – an action performed for a reason. (2) To
succeed on a direct test, one needs to understand the
difference between objective and subjective reasons, which
requires awareness of different perspectives. (3) Children
master this ability only at around 4 years of age (Table 1).
Intentional action and justifying reasons
Predicting human behaviour is fraught with uncertainty
(as financial markets illustrate every day). How do we ever
manage to know what someone will be doing next? If you
know that I am suffering from hay fever, you may be able to
predict my sneezing on entering the haystack. However, an
interest in someone’s future actions is usually an interest
in their intentional actions. The intentional character of
the to-be-predicted action is often written into the ques-
tion: for example, where will Max look for the chocolate?
Unlike sneezing, looking for something is inherently goal
directed. There is a close – some would say conceptual –
connection between intentional action and a certain kind of
explanation; at first pass, to act intentionally is to act in a
way that is intelligible in terms of one’s justifying (or
‘normative’) reasons. [8,9]. Accordingly, normally the best
way to predict what someone will intentionally do is by
ascertaining what it makes sense for her to do; that is, what
she has reason to do.
In summary, the question ‘where will Max look?’
involves a view of Max as an intentional agent, with the
implication that (usually) the best way to answer it is by
determining where it would make rational sense for Max to
look.
Objective and subjective reasons
One might wonder whether younger children really under-
stand these finer points of the test question. Perhaps they
Table 1. Developmental pervasiveness of perspective around 4 years of age – relationship between standard false belief task and
other perspective-taking tasks
Task Refs Participant number and age Correlation with false belief
Raw Partial Controlling for
Visual perspective
taking Level 2 [23]
[24] n = 38; 4;2 – 8;5
n = 22; 4;5 – 12;9 (autism)
0.87 0.34 vMAa, mental rotation
[25] Training transfer from false belief task to visual perspective tasks: not successful
Appearance reality
distinction [26]
[27] Two studies: N = 101; 2;10 – 6;3 0.49 – 0.44
[28] N = 153; 3;4 – 4;8 Not reported 0.30 Age + vMA
[29] Early exposure of deaf children to language, signed or oral, facilitates performance on both tasks
False signs [30] Review of seven studies 0.50 – 0.88 All significant Age or vMA
Ambiguous figures [31] Two studies: N = 138; 2;10 – 5;9 0.43 – 0.47 0.24 Age
[32] Seven studies: N = 326; 2;3 – 6;0 0.42 0.20 Age + vMA
Multiple labels for an object
Alternative naming [33] Four studies: N = 133, 2;5 – 4;7 0.65 – 0.83 0.60 – 0.85 vMA or control task
[34] One study: n = 48, 2;11 – 4;7 0.71 0.54 Age + vMA
[35] Three studies, seven
data sets: N = 100; 2;8 – 6;1
0.53 – 0.77 0.25 – 0.62 Age + vMA
Identity statements [36] Study 1: n = 41; 3 – 5 0.57 0.39 Age
Study 2: n = 78; 2;11 – 5;11 0.68 .50 Age + vMA
Understanding competition
Bead gameb Priewasser et al.
(unpublished)
n = 86; 2;10 – 5;10 0.43 0.26 Age + vMA + inhibition
+ working memory
avMA, verbal mental age.
bBead game. Groups of three children take turns casting a die and collecting the corresponding number of beads to stack on a pole. Whoever reaches the top first wins.
Instructions make explicit that beads can be taken from either a common source or an opponent’s stack. The tendency to poach from an opponent was recorded because it
marks an understanding that players take different perspectives on what the goal is (Box 4).
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younger children reliably give the wrong answer suggests
that there is some method to their poor performance. We
propose the following explanation. Young children do pre-
dict where Max will look by determining where he has
reason to look. It is just that – not unnaturally – they take
the fact that the chocolate is in the green cupboard to mean
that this is where Max has reason to go, and they are
oblivious to the fact that there is another sense in which
Max has reason to go to the blue cupboard. We will express
this by saying that young children base their prediction on
Max’s objective reason (provided by the actual location of
the chocolate) rather than on his subjective reason (pro-
vided by his belief about the location of the chocolate).
In the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, reasons
for action are often simply equated with suitable pairs of
beliefs and desires; that is, with attitudes that provide
subjective reasons in our sense. Why do we need the notion
of an objective reason? Here are some ‘intuition pumps’
illustrating the central role that objective reasons arguably
play in adult commonsense psychology.
(i) The primary context in which we think about
practical reasons is a situation in which we deliberate
about what to do. Suppose you suddenly remember
that there is a staff meeting at 2 p.m. Should you leave
your office now to go to the meeting? It would not be
sensible for you to try to settle this question by looking
for evidence as to whether you believe it to be 2pm.
Whether you have a good reason to set off now
depends on what the actual time is.
(ii) We make mistakes about practical reasons more often
and more easily than about what we believe and
desire. Suppose you falsely believe it is only 1.30 p.m.When you discover your mistake, you learn that you
should have gone to the meeting (you had a reason to
go) some time ago.
(iii) When you are asked to offer practical advice to
someone, the natural way to proceed is to reflect on
the facts of the advisee’s situation. If Max asked you
where he should go to look for his chocolate, it would
not be particularly helpful to say ‘you should go to the
blue cupboard – after all, you believe that is where the
chocolate is.’ The natural advice is ‘you should go to
the green cupboard – you have reason to (that is
where the chocolate is)’ [10].
In brief, objective reasons are facts or ‘considerations’
(usually non-psychological considerations) that justify, or
‘count in favour of’, doing something [11]. Why, then, in
addition, do we need the notion of a subjective reason? We
need some such notion (no matter how we label it) to
acknowledge the sense in which even an ill-informed action
such as Max’s can be justified. After all, it is perfectly
rational for Max to go to the blue cupboard, despite the fact
that there is no objective reason for him to go there. What
makes his action rational is that he (rationally) believes
the chocolate to be in the blue cupboard. Correlatively,
from Max’s perspective, it looks as if he has an objective
reason to go to the blue cupboard. Thus, discussion about
someone’s subjective reasons might be understood as a way
to talk about their perspectives on their objective reasons.
In any case, the two notions are mutually irreducible and
neither is dispensable (Box 3).
Our suggestion, in summary, is that young children’s
answer to the test question reflects their attempt to make
sense of Max’s action in terms of his objective reasons521
Box 3. Reasons in the human ‘theory of mind’: three issues
The contrast we draw between an implicit theory of behaviour and
explicit explanations of intentional actions in terms of justifying
reasons recalls the debate between ‘theory theorists’ and ‘simulation
theorists’ over the nature of folk psychology. We clarify the relation-
ship by distinguishing three issues.
Reasons and action explanation
Theory theorists hold that a ‘theory of mind’ is a theory in much the
same sense as geology or chemistry: we explain the occurrence of an
event, whether an intentional action or the eruption of a volcano, by
subsuming it under some lawful regularity. (Compare Gopnik and
Meltzoff’s [47] basic explanatory schema of folk psychology: ‘If a
psychological agent wants event y and believes that action x will
cause event y, he will do x.’) Some simulation theorists, rightly in our
view, have objected that to think of an action as intentional one needs
to be able to explain it in terms of the agent’s reason for acting, and
they have argued that doing so requires mental simulation, in the
sense of recreating in imagination the agent’s reason-giving mental
states [48,49].
Reasons and rationality
Following Davidson [9], it is commonly assumed in the philosophy of
mind and cognitive science that practical reasons are suitable pairs of
beliefs and desires. As Hornsby [50] observed, this contrasts with
standard practice in ethics, in which practical reasons are conceived
not as mental states but as facts (or ‘considerations’). The ethicists’
notion is arguably indispensable and in a way primary: to understand
that Max has a belief–desire reason to go to the blue cupboard, one
needs to appreciate that, from his perspective, there appears to be a
consideration that counts in favor of going there. The distinction
between the two kinds of reasons (or between what we have reason
to do and what it is rational for us to do, given our beliefs and desires)
opens up the possibility that young children might explain actions
‘teleologically’, in terms of reason-giving facts rather than beliefs and
desires [12,13]. Note that even adults frequently assign an explana-
tory role to reason-giving facts; we often explain intentional actions in
terms of the agent’s factive mental states (e.g., she was looking in the
blue cupboard because she knew the chocolate was there). In such
explanations, the explanans is a mental state that encompasses a
reason-giving fact [50].
Perspective taking
What is involved in understanding that, from Max’s perspective, there
appears to be reason to go to the green cupboard? The basic insight
behind ‘simulation theory’ is that such perspective taking involves
using one’s own practical reasoning abilities. However, simulation
theorists typically make the more contentious claim that the
interpreter needs to put these abilities to work by simulating,
imagining, or recreating in ‘pretend mode’ the agent’s first-personal
practical reasoning. An alternative view is that what is essential is
merely hypothetical teleological reasoning: to find out what Max has
a subjective reason to do given his belief, one merely needs to
determine what he would have objective reason to do, were his belief
true. [13] Reason-giving explanation, according to this view, is a more
basic skill than standard versions of the simulation theory would lead
one to believe.
Review Trends in Cognitive Sciences October 2012, Vol. 16, No. 10[12,13]. In an obvious sense, Max should (has reason to) go
to the green cupboard; this is what a well-meaning specta-
tor would advise him to do. Thus, children’s poor perfor-
mance on direct tests simultaneously manifests a crucial
accomplishment (they are able to think of people as agents
of intentional actions) and an important limitation (they
equate people’s reasons for actions with objective reasons).Box 4. Outstanding questions
 Flexibility of early sensitivity: is early sensitivity based on
‘behaviour rules’, drawing a direct inference from observed
behaviour to predicted behaviour, or on inferring from what is
being observed a belief and from that the likely behaviour? A
potential test would be to teach children new knowledge in the
presence of another person and see whether they apply it
spontaneously in their inferences about that person.
 Competitive goals and sabotage: children’s difficulty to switch
intentionally to a different perspective before 4 years of age
should not only affect their understanding of beliefs but also of
the fact that agents can pursue competing goals and sabotage
each other. The only test of this comprises pilot work (see
Priewasser et al., unpublished, in Table 1) showing a relationship
between false belief understanding and appreciation of competi-
tive games. Investigation of a broader spectrum is needed.
 The role of language: late language acquisition tends to have a
strong effect on passing classic false belief tests [51] (though not
online measures [43]). DeVilliers [52] argued that the effect is due
to the grammatical form of that-complements being required for
thinking about belief (she thinks that. . .). An alternative reason for
the delay could be that language is a prime medium for building
awareness of perspectives (e.g., differences in visual perspective
become salient when confronted by a seemingly contradictory
description given by someone from a different vantage point).
One way to adjudicate this would be to investigate whether
delayed language equally delays all kinds of perspective tasks or
only those that involve that-complements.
522Note that there is independent evidence that by 3 years of
age children have some understanding of justifying rea-
sons, as shown in their interactions with mother and
siblings [14,15].
The role of perspective
To give the right answer to the test question, children need
to be aware of Max having a different perspective on his
reasons from their own, to switch intentionally to that
perspective. Without such awareness, they will predict
that Max will go to where he should go, namely where
the chocolate is. Children become able to intentionally
adopt other perspectives around 4 years of age, as evi-
denced by the fact that many perspective-taking tasks
correlate with correct responding in the false belief task
(Table 1).
By contrast, a voluntary shift to an agent’s perspective
may not be required for children’s behaviour, indicating
early sensitivity. Eye-tracking [2] and other studies [16]
document that infants are keen to register and record what
others did and did not perceptually track; that is, they keep
an experiential record. The announcement of the agent’s
reappearance is likely to evoke these records and make the
infants think of what the agent had experienced. What the
agent had experienced (the object in its original location)
corresponds to the content of the agent’s false belief.
Thinking of this content allows children to anticipate a
possible action based on this content and influences their
looking behaviour. They can do this unencumbered by any
pressure to make sense of the action in terms of practical
reasons or having to justify their looking. Because the
experiential record perspective corresponds to the agent’s
belief about the object’s current location, this anticipation
can be seen as an implicit representation of the agent’s
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Figure 1. Identity task by Low and Watts [18]. Location false belief task (not
shown, general set-up similar to figure). Children watch (i) the agent looking how
the object is put under the left cover and (ii) that the agent is distracted by a phone
call and looks away while the object is moved to under the other cover. (iii) The
agent attends to the scene again and the windows start blinking. (iv) The child’s
eye gaze to left or right window is recorded as an indicator of where the child
expects the agent’s hand to appear. (v) The child is asked where the hand will
appear. Identity task. (a) Establishing preference. Children learn that the agent,
who watches a red object disappear under one cover and a blue object under the
other cover, always prefers to retrieve the blue object through the window that is
closest to that object. Before the agent reaches through one of the windows, the
windows blink, which makes children look in anticipation to the window they
expect the hand to appear. After training, children looked to the window behind
the cover with the blue object 94% of times at 3 years and 100% at 4 years. (b) False
belief test. (i) Children are shown that a red robot is under the left cover. (ii) The
agent appears. (iii) The child sees how the agent observes the robot (now with its
blue side facing the child) move from under the left to the right cover. (iv) The child
but not the agent observes that the red robot is blue on its other side. (v) The child
sees how the agent observes the robot move from under the right to the left cover.
(vi) The windows blink indicating that the agent is about to search for a blue object.
(vii) The child’s eye gaze to the left or right window is recorded as an indicator of
where the child expects the agent’s hand to appear. (viii) The child is asked where
the hand will appear. (c) Results. In the false belief location version (green triangles
in panel c) [2], almost all 3-year-olds look in anticipation to the window in front of
the cover where the agent thinks the object is (broken green line), whereas only
about 30% make the corresponding prediction in answer to a question (full green
line). This percentage increases by 4 years and reaches a ceiling in college
students. According to the new false belief identity version red squares in panel c,
children’s predictions (full red line) lag slightly behind the location version. In stark
contrast, there is almost no anticipatory looking (broken red line) by children and
Review Trends in Cognitive Sciences October 2012, Vol. 16, No. 10belief. Note that we are not suggesting that children think
of an experiential record as evidence that the agent has a
certain belief. An implicit representation is not a reasoned
judgement. It may not involve the concept of belief at all
(though it may play an important role in facilitating the
acquisition of the concept) [13] (Box 4).
In summary, the final element in our explanation of
false belief understanding in the classical test is the need to
intentionally switch to a different perspective to answer a
direct test question correctly (to identify the agent’s sub-
jective reason for his action). This need is bypassed in the
non-committal expectation expressed in the anticipatory
looking paradigm.
The competing account: competence masking theory
This approach posits an early – typically assumed to be
innately – available essential understanding of belief in
infancy [17]. This early competence is masked in the
standard false belief task, which exceeds children’s perfor-
mance limitations such as lack of inhibitory control, work-
ing memory restrictions, or insufficient language
proficiency. Baillargeon et al.’s [3] response account is
the most detailed version of this approach. Infants are
successful on indirect measures because they only need to
represent the agent’s false belief. They fail in the standard
test because ‘. . .when asked the test question, children
must access their representation of the agent’s false belief
to select a response,. . . when selecting a response, children
must inhibit any prepotent tendency to answer the test
question based on their own knowledge.’
A comparison of the two accounts
A common problem for both accounts arises from the fact
that in the helping and the referential communication task
(Box 1), a verbal request is made. In Baillargeon et al.’s [3]
response account, one would assume that this verbal re-
quest should lead to the same overload as the question in
the standard test. The authors provide the following ex-
planation of why this is not the case: ‘. . .the infants in these
indirect-elicited-response tasks represented the agent’s
false belief and used this representation to infer what goal
the agent was trying to achieve. . .or which object was the
sefo. . .’. This means that the brittle belief representation
does its work before the request is made (e.g. the intended
object is identified as ‘sefo’ before the request is made) and
any subsequent overload due to the request does not
change this. This explanation also solves the same problem
for our account.
The accounts differ in two respects, though they agree
that the online tasks make it possible, in a sense, for
infants to ‘take’ the agent’s perspective. One difference
concerns how children come to adopt the agent’s perspec-
tive. The other focuses on why children cannot maintain
this perspective when a question is asked in the traditional
false belief test.
The agent’s perspective, in Baillargeon’s response ac-
count [3], is captured by infants inferring the agent’s belief.even college students (19 years). This shows that anticipatory looking occurs
only when an experiential record based on Level 1 perspective taking is available
(location version) but not otherwise as in Low and Watt’s ‘identity’ problem.
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Review Trends in Cognitive Sciences October 2012, Vol. 16, No. 10In contrast, our account appeals to the experiential record
for the agent’s actions. For instance, in Southgate’s antici-
patory looking task (Box 1), the child observes the agent
perceptually tracking the object’s movement into one loca-
tion and failing to track the location change when being
distracted (Level 1 perspective taking). The study of Low
and Watts [18] (Figure 1) makes clear how important it is
for young children’s success in this task to build such a
record. The child sees only the agent track the robot
moving from box 1 to box 2 and back. The child cannot
see that the object appears to the agent to be a blue robot
moving from 1 to 2 and a red robot moving from 2 to 1
(a Level 2 or higher perspective problem). Thus, the expe-
riential record does not correspond to the content of the
agent’s belief and the looking data show no anticipation of
the agent’s expected action.
By contrast, all online tasks used hitherto (Box 1)
provide a relevant experiential record on the basis of Level
1 perspective taking. For instance, in the helping as well as
the referential communication task, the experimenter’s
reappearance makes the infants think of where the exper-
imenter last witnessed the object. This corresponds to the
content of the agent’s false belief: the object is still in its
original place. This representation prompts children to
think of the agent opening the box as an attempt to find
the object inside, or to think of the agent pointing to that
box and talking about the sefo inside as an attempt to refer
to the original content of this box.
Interestingly, Level 1 perspectives [19], but not Level 2
information [20], are registered automatically by adults.
This suggests that only automatically processed informa-
tion is available for performance on indirect measures such
as looking in expectation.
The effect of the test question also plays different roles
in the two accounts. According to the response account, the
question overloads children’s processing capacity, the be-
lief representation, being the ‘weakest link’, is deleted, and
the children rely on the basic expectation that people look
for objects where they are actually located. In contrast, our
account assumes that the question triggers a ‘justification
mode’. Children look for justifying reasons for what Max
should do: he should go to where his chocolate actually is –
the typical, wrong answer. To get it right, children need
intentionally to switch to Max’s perspective to ascertain his
subjective reasons. This they cannot do until about 4 years
of age (Box 1).
Answer latencies collected by Atance et al. [21] support
this view. Three-year-old children’s wrong answers (actual
location) were faster than their correct answers (believed
location), whereas 4- and 5-year-olds were faster on correct
than on wrong answers. The answer latencies of the youn-
ger children pose a problem for the competence masking
explanation: if – as assumed – the children represent the
agent’s belief, are ready to predict his action accordingly,
and can also process the experimenter’s question, correct
responses should be fast. However, when the question
overloads their system, they have to fall back on a different
assumption leading to wrong answers, which should there-
fore take longer. This is the opposite of what the data show.
By contrast, the latencies fit with children’s certainties
[22]. Younger false belief test failers tended to be very524certain of their wrong answers and the older failers much
less so; however, younger passers were less certain of their
correct answers than were older passers. In other words,
most younger children go straight for objective reasons
and, consequently, give the wrong answer with conviction
and quickly. The minority that give the correct answer tend
to be fledgling understanders of perspective differences
looking for subjective reasons. They are uncertain of their
correct answers and slow. By contrast, the older children
are either fledgling perspective understanders who still
use objective facts but have developed doubts about their
universal use and therefore give their wrong answers
slowly, or they are solid understanders of perspective
differences who are convinced of their correct answer
and respond fast.
Concluding remarks
We have made a case for early understanding of belief
being implicit. Infants keep track of what agents perceive
(experiential record); in particular, the state of the world
last seen by the agent. Focus on the agent activates this
record and induces them to construe the agent’s actions or
to anticipate future actions on the basis of this record.
Because the record reflects the agent’s belief about the
state of the world, this interpretation tendency amounts to
an implicit understanding of the agent’s belief. This online
tendency is broken when a question is asked about the
agent’s likely action (or without question when children of
their own accord become concerned about correctness);
then, children think explicitly of the agent’s reasons for
how to act. In the false belief task, this requires an under-
standing of the agent’s divergent perspective on objective
reasons. The required switch in perspective is beyond
children below about 4 years of age, as evidenced by solid
correlations between the false belief task and a large
variety of other perspective tasks.
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